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THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE TORT OF
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION: ARE
PUBLISHERS NEXT?
Deborah A. Ballam *
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both American and English courts have significantly
expanded the scope of the tort of negligent misrepresentation-the mak-
ing of an unintentional false representation by a party who acted unrea-
sonably in not determining the true facts, in the manner of expressing the
statement, or in making the statement in the absence of necessary skill or
competence to judge the accuracy of the statement.' Time-honored
precedents limiting or denying the existence of the tort, such as Derry v.
Peek2 and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,3 have been whittled away, espe-
cially in the area of professional malpractice.' Based on the reasoning of
cases expanding negligent misrepresentation liability into the accounting
field, some courts have opened the door to holding publishers liable for
losses suffered because of reliance on negligently printed, erroneous state-
ments by eliminating a first amendment defense.5
For over sixty years, publishers have relied on a New York case,
Jaillet v. Cashman,6 as protection against liability for negligent misrepre-
sentation.7 In Jaillet, the defendant, Dow Jones & Company, incorrectly
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fessor Ballam received her B.A. in history in 1972, her M.A. in history in 1974, and her J.D. in
1977 from Ohio State University.
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 704 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
3. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
4. See infra notes 14-19, 68-89 and accompanying text.
5. Courts have held that no first amendment protections extend to objective, verifiable
data. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex.
1988), op. withdrawn and substituted by, No. H-87-0030 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file).
6. 115 Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 511 (1923).
7. See generally Berns, The Expanding Domain of Negligent Misstatement, 8 U. TASMA-
NIA L. REv. 127 (1985); Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. Rv. 231
(1966); Shimomura, Federal Misrepresentation: Protecting the Reliance Interest, 60 TUL. L.
REv. 596 (1986); Smillie, Negligence and Economic Loss, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 231 (1982);
Note, Negligent Misrepresentation: A New Trap for the Unwary?, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1184
(1981); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation in Missouri: Tooling Up for the Tort of the
Eighties, 50 Mo. L. REv. 877 (1985).
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reported the effect a United States Supreme Court decision would have
on the taxation of stock dividends as income.' Jaillet, relying on the in-
correct report, sold some stocks at a loss.9 To recover that loss, he filed
an action against Dow Jones alleging that the company was negligent in
making the inaccurate report.10 The court refused to impose liability for
two reasons. First, there was no contract between the parties; hence
there was no privity. Absent privity, the court refused to impose liabil-
ity. 1 Second, the misrepresentation was merely negligent, and not inten-
tional. The court reasoned that if Dow Jones were held liable for
negligence to this plaintiff, then it would be equally liable to all readers
who were misled by the misrepresentation. 2 The court admitted that
although it might logically find such liability, it could not do so "as a
matter of practical expediency."
1 3
Jaillet has been widely cited for the proposition that members of the
public may not hold publishers liable for negligent misrepresentation. 4
The last two decades, however, have witnessed a dramatic evolution in
the law regarding liability for negligent misrepresentation,"5 particularly
with respect to the misrepresenter's liability to third persons with whom
there was no privity relationship. 16 The most noteworthy expansion of
liability for negligent misrepresentation has occurred in the public ac-
8. Jaillet, 115 Misc. at 384, 189 N.Y.S. at 744.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, eg., Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(encyclopedia publisher not liable for negligently misrepresenting toxicity of chemical); Gutter
v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986) (publisher not liable for dam-
ages incurred by reader relying on incorrect bond listing in newspaper). See also, Annotation,
Newspaper's Liability to Reader-Investor for Negligent but Nondefamatory Misstatement of Fi-
nancial News, 56 A.L.R. 4TH 1162 (1987).
15. See sources cited supra note 7.
16. For example, the following professionals have been held liable for negligent misrepre-
sentation to forseeable third parties who rely on a misrepresentation:
Title abstract preparers-Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (title abstacter liable to third parties that could reasonably be foreseen to rely
on negligent misrepresentation); Chun v. Park, 51 Haw. 462, 462 P.2d 905 (1969) (preparer of
title abstract liable to known third party for whose benefit abstract was being prepared); Wil-
liams v. Polgar, 43 Mich. App. 95, 204 N.W.2d 57 (1972) (title abstractors liable to reasonably
foreseeable third parties), aff'd, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974);
Attorneys-United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313 (1980)
(lessor stated cause of action against lawyer for negligently failing to discover existance of lien
on property used as collateral for execution of a leasing agreement);
Surveyors-Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975) (surveyors
liable to reasonably forseeable third parites who rely on accuracy of survey); Rozny v. Marnul,
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counting profession.17 Currently, in some jurisdictions, an accountant
may be held liable for negligent misrepresentations contained in annual
reports prepared by the accountant and received for a business purpose
by any party who might reasonably be foreseen to rely upon the report. 8
Because such parties could include every present or future investor or
creditor of a company, accountants in these jurisdictions are, in effect,
potentially liable to the entire investment world.19
Though not decided on negligent misrepresentation grounds, a re-
cent Texas case could portend the expansion of liability for negligent mis-
representation to publishers.20 In Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (surveyor liable to third party he knew might rely on
plat);
Soil engineers-M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1961) (soil engineer who provided soil report to sanitation district regarding feasibility of
sewer construction liable to third party who bid on project and based cost estimates on soil
engineer's report);
Architects-Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967) (architect, who incorrectly
certified to owner amount of work satisfactorily performed on unfinished project with result
that owner paid incorrect amount to contractor, liable to contractor's surety who had been
required to reimburse owner for overpaid amount);
Notaries public-Baikanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (notary public
who failed to provide for correct attestation of will liable to intended beneficiary);
Accountants-see infra note 17.
17. See generally Achampong, Common Law Liability of Accountants for Negligence to
Non-Contractual Parties: Recent Developments, 91 DICK. L. REv. 677 (1987); Leibensperger,
The Erosion of Ultramares: Expansion of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for Negli-
gence, 69 MAss. L. REv. 54 (1984); O'Brien, The Legal Environment of the Accounting Profes-
sion, 25 DUQ. L. REv. 283 (1987); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public
Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983); Comment,
Extensions of Accountants' Liability For Negligence: One Step Closer to a New Implied War-
ranty of Results, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 265 (1985); Note, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPAs
Liable At Common Law To Certain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who Detrimentally
Rely On Negligently Audited Financial Statements, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1985); Note,
Tort Law-The Enlarging Scope of Auditors' Liability To Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 281 (1983); Note, Rosenblum v. Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court Ex-
pandsAccountants'Liability, 37 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 161 (1984); Comment, Accountants'Liabil-
ity to the Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689 (1985).
18. See e.g., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
19. Nevertheless, some decisions have imposed very narrow liability. See, e.g., McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Delaware law); Stephens Industries, Inc. v.
Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado law); Toro Co. v. Krouse,
Kern & Co., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (applying Indiana law), aff'd, 827 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1987); Investment Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
20. Eimann, 680 F. Supp. 863. For a description of the case, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1988, § A, at 12, col. 1 and 56 U.S.L.W. 2520 (Mar. 22, 1988).
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Magazine, Inc.,21 the court opened the door for the publisher of Soldier
of Fortune magazine to be held liable on a negligence theory to the family
of a woman whose husband procured her hired killer through a classified
advertisement in that magazine.12 The publisher unsuccessfully moved
to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment on the grounds that
the first amendment protected it from liability for mere negligence.2" In
rejecting the publisher's argument, the Texas court reasoned that "there
can be little concern that '"regulation" by way of a negligence cause of
action will chill ... expression or diminish the free flow of commercial
[speech].' 24 The court recognized that "[it is axiomatic that commer-
cial speech, although enjoying some degree of first amendment protec-
tion, is not entitled to the stringent protection afforded to core speech.""5
For commercial speech, then, publishers have much less protection
under the first amendment than they do for other types of speech.
Thus, a change from traditional views of publisher liability may be
occurring.6 This Article explores the likelihood that courts will beginholding publishers liable for negligent misrepresentation. The Article
21. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988), op. withdrawn and substituted by, No. H-87-0030
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
22. Id. at 865.
23. Id. at 864.
24. Id. at 866 (quoting South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.,
676 F. Supp. 346, 350 (D.D.C. 1987)).
The advertisement the killer placed in Soldier of Fortune read as follows, "EX-
MARINES-67-69 'Nam Vets--ex-DI-weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high
risk assignments U.S. or overseas. (404) 991-2684." Id. at 864. The decedent's husband saw
the advertisement and arranged to have his wife killed. Her mother and son then brought suit
against the magazine for negligence in publishing the advertisement and failing to investigate
the person who placed the advertisement. Id.
25. Id. at 865. In a footnote, the court defined core speech as "that which contains
'[i]deological expression' and is 'integrally related to the exposition of thought.'" Id. n.2
(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
26. Traditionally, courts have not held publishers liable for the content of advertisements
placed with them. See, eg., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr.
519 (1969).
A trial court in New York once held a newspaper liable for emotional distress damages to
a woman whose home telephone number was published by mistake in a singles advertisement
suggesting she was available for sexual purposes. Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publish-
ing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971). Higher courts in New York,
however, in subsequent cases, repudiated the principle that publishers can be held liable for
mistakes in their advertising. See, e.g., Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch Corp., 129 Misc. 2d 477, 493
N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Pressler v. Dow Jones & Co., 88 A.D.2d 928, 450
N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); see also Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921,
922 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987), for a discussion of the development of
New York law on this point. Indeed, in several recent cases courts have addressed the issue of
the scope of publishers' liability for negligent misrepresentation. See First Equity Corp. of
EXPANDING PUBLISHER LIABILITY
first examines the development of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
Next, it explores the similarities between the policy arguments used to
hold accountants liable to third parties and the arguments that could be
used to hold publishers liable for negligent misrepresentation. Finally,
the Article examines the various first amendment concerns in applying
this tort to the press. The Article shows that the arguments against hold-
ing publishers liable for such a tort are essentially the same arguments
that have been made unsuccessfully against holding accountants liable
for the same tort. First amendment concerns, of course, are much more
significant in the case of publishers than in the case of accountants. 27
However, recent case law indicates that some types of negligent misrep-
resentation may not be constitutionally protected.28 Thus, the press may
be the next profession that falls prey to the ever-expanding scope of this
tort.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
A. General Background
Any discussion of the development of the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation must begin with the 1889 English case of Derry v. Peek.29 In
Derry, the defendants, directors of a tramway corporation, indicated in a
prospectus for stock subscriptions that the company had the right to use
steam or mechanical power on their cars, instead of horses.30 In fact, at
the time the prospectus was issued the company did not have this right;
Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Pittman, 662 F. Supp.
921; Demuth Dev. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 990; Gutter, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898.
An Ohio appellate court, in Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., No. 84AP-1029 (Ohio 10th App.
Dist. May 16, 1985) (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file), a decision later overturned by the
Ohio Supreme Court, Gutter, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898, reversed and remanded a
trial court's dismissal of a suit for negligent misrepresentation against Dow Jones, publisher of
the Wall Street Journal. Gutter, No. 84AP-1029, slip op. at 7 (WESTLAW, Ohio library,
Cases file at 8-9). The suit was brought by a reader who made an investment decision based on
an incorrect stock quotation, resulting in a financial loss. Id. at 2 (WESTLAW, Ohio library,
Cases fie at 2). The Wall Street Journal incorrectly listed certain corporate bonds as trading
with interest, while they were actually trading flat. The plaintiff, in reidnce on the incorrect
statement, purchased more than $36,000 worth of the bonds. Id. When the Wall Street Jour-
nal corrected the erroneous information, the bonds' market value decreased, resulting in a loss
to plaintiff of $1,692.50. Id.
27. The first amendment, of course, protects freedom of speech and of the press; U.S.
CONST. amend. I, thus it is a significant factor in the application of tort liability for negligent
misrepresentation to publishers.
28. See infra notes 185-213 and accompanying text.
29. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
30. Id. at 338.
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rather, it was expecting soon to receive approval from the government
authorities to use steam or mechanical power.3" The plaintiff purchased
stock relying on the statement in the prospectus indicating that the com-
pany already had obtained approval.32 Eventually, government authori-
ties disapproved the company's application, the value of the stock
plummeted, and the plaintiff filed an action grounded in deceit. 33 Be-
cause there was no intent to mislead, and merely negligent misrepresen-
tation, the English court refused to hold the defendants liable under the
deceit theory. 34 For the next seventy-four years, English courts, because
of dictum in the opinion, interpreted the ruling in Derry as denying any
remedy for negligent misrepresentation that results merely in pecuniary
loss. 35 Finally, in the 1963 case of Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Part-
ners Ltd.,36 the English courts reversed Derry, holding that recovery
should be allowed in negligent misrepresentation cases where the plaintiff
had a "special relationship" with the defendant.37
In the United States, the ruling in Derry was not well received by
either the courts or legal scholars. 38  The prevailing view of American
courts, although they paid lip-service to Derry, was to permit a negli-
gence action for negligent misrepresentation even where the only harm
was a pecuniary loss. 39 Professor Jeremiah Smith produced one of the
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 343-80.
35. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 705. Prosser suggested that the English courts in fact
misinterpreted Derry, and that the ruling only prohibited recovery on a deceit theory because
there was no intent to misrepresent on the facts in that case. The suggestion Prosser makes is
that had the plaintiff pursued the theory of negligent misrepresentation, rather than deceit, he
might have won. Prosser, supra note 7, at 234.
Professor Smith makes a similar suggestion. See Smith, Liability for Negligent Language,
14 HI Rv. L. REv. 184, 185 (1900). For additional discussions of Derry, see Goodhart, Liabil-
ity for Innocent But Negligent Misrepresentations, 74 YALE L.J. 286, 289 (1964); Shimomura,
supra note 7, at 606-08.
36. 1964 App. Cas. 465 (1963).
37. Id. at 486. Special relationship involves some sort of trust relationship between the
parties. See infra notes 47, 64 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 705; Prosser, supra note 7, at 233-34; see also W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 740 (5th ed. 1984), where the position of Amer-
ican courts on Deny is described as follows:
The majority purport to accept [Derry] as sound law, but a great many of them have
devised various more or less ingenious fictions and formulae which permit them to
render lip service to Deny v. Peek, yet allow recovery in deceit for misrepresentations
which fall short of actual intent to deceive.... [lit is by no means clear that Derry v.
Peek is supported by the weight of American authority.
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earliest American scholarly works on the topic of negligent misrepresen-
tation," in which he charged that the widely adopted interpretation of
Derry as prohibiting any action for negligent misrepresentation was sim-
ply erroneous.4 Derry should have been interpreted only as precluding
the use of the legal theory of deceit in an action for negligent misrepre-
sentation because of the absence of intent. If the plaintiff had pursued
the case based on a negligence theory, Smith asserted, he might have
been successful. 42 Smith concluded that sound legal theory would allow
a negligence action for negligent misrepresentation, even where the harm
was a pecuniary loss. 43 If the elements traditionally required to prove
negligence existed, then recovery should be allowed.
Other legal scholars of the early twentieth century supported
Smith's position.' Professor Williston actually went further, suggesting
that there should be liability even for innocent misrepresentation. 4  For
Williston, the issue was, as between two innocent parties, even where the
misrepresentation was neither intentional nor negligent, who should bear
the loss?' He concluded that fairness dictated that the misrepresenter,
however honestly motivated, should bear the loss.47 In effect, Williston
40. Smith, supra note 35.
41. Id. at 185.
42. Id. at 185-86.
43. Id. at 194-95. Smith then specified the circumstances under which he would impose
liability for negligent misrepresentation:
(1) Defendant volunteered a statement to the plaintiff;
(2) The statement was not in fact true;
(3) Defendant, though believing the statement, had no reasonable ground for such belief;
(4) Defendant made the statement with the intention that plaintiff should act on it;
(5) The subject matter of the statement was such that one who acted in reliance upon it would
be likely to incur substantial pecuniary loss in case the statement proved incorrect;
(6) Plaintiff acted in reliance upon the statement, and such action and reliance on his part was
reasonable; and
(7) Plaintiff was damaged by so acting.
Id. at 195-96.
44. See, e-g., Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepre-
sentation, 24 ILL. L. REv. 749 (1930); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24
HARV. L. REv. 415, 437 (1911).
45. Williston, supra note 44.
46. Id. at 437.
47. Id. Williston's test for imposing liability is similar to Smith's, with the exception of the
third element of Smith's formulation. See supra note 43. Compare Smith, supra note 35, and
184-95 with Williston, supra note 44, where Williston states:
If a man makes a statement in regard to a matter upon which his hearer may reason-
ably suppose he has the means of information, and that he is speaking with full
knowledge, and the statement is made as a part of a business transaction, or to induce
action from which the speaker expects to gain an advantage, he should be held liable
for his misstatement.
Williston, supra note 44, at 437.
April 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
advocated absolute liability for misrepresentation.
Some early commentators suggested that Derry was a product of its
economic times, where individualism reigned supreme.48 However, as
the needs of society changed, individualism gave way to more complex
social and business methods, resulting in a need to expand the legal pro-
tection given to various societal interests.49 Professor Weisiger, for ex-
ample, argued that duties arise as societal and economic changes make it
increasingly difficult for an individual to protect his own interests.50
Thus, the limitations of liability for negligent misrepresentation change
with the times.
The issue as it developed in this country, then, was not whether
there should be liability for negligent misrepresentation, but where the
limitations on that liability should be placed." The first significant
American case to address the issue was Glanzer v. Shepard, a 1922 New
York case.5 2 In Glanzer, the defendant contracted with a bean seller to
weigh the beans and certify that weight to a third party, the purchaser.5 3
The weight the defendant reported to the purchaser was incorrect, and
the purchaser suffered pecuniary loss due to the inaccuracy. 54 The de-
fendant was held liable to the third party for economic loss arising from
negligent misrepresentation. 5 The court was willing to find liability be-
cause the defendant knew at the time the contract was entered into that a
third party was to receive the benefit of the contract.5 6 Hence, the court
48. See, eg., Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REv. 866, 874
(1930).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 875. Weisiger stated: "Duties arise as it becomes difficult or inexpedient for the
plaintiff to protect his own interests, or when he may properly assume that they will not be
invaded by the defendant's conduct. In this respect an interest grows in legal significance as
individuals must depend more on each other." Id.; see also Note, Torts: Deceit: Liability of
accountant for negligent misrepresentations, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 419 (1931), where the author
asserts, "It may well be that in the future, under changed economic conditions, it will be
desirable to extend the liability for negligent misrepresentations." Id. at 425.
51. See, eg., Carpenter, supra note 44, at 756, where the author stated: "If the law is to
adopt a principle of liability for negligent misrepresentation, it is clear that there must be some
limitation."
52. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). One commentator described the effect of this
decision as follows: "The dictum in Derry v. Peek was swept aside without comment in
Glanzer v. Shepard . . . ." Note, Limitations on the Action for Negligent Misrepresentation-
The Ultramares Case, 31 COLUM. L. Rlv. 858, 862 (1931). The Glanzer case has been dis-
cussed extensively in legal literature. See, e.g., Gossman, IMC v. Butler: A Case for Expanded
Professional Liability for Negligent Misrepresentation?, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 102 (1988).
53. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276.
56. Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 277.
[Vol. 22:761
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recognized that the defendant owed a duty not just to the party to the
contract, the seller, but also to the known intended beneficiary of the
contract.57
The impact of the Glanzer decision, however, has been overshad-
owed by a 1931 decision issued by the same court, Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.58 In Ultramares, the defendant-auditor, because of negligence in
preparing an audit, inaccurately certified a company's balance sheet
showing a net worth of over a million dollars. In fact, the company was
in dire financial straits and had very little capital.5 9 When it performed
the audit and certified the balance sheet, the defendant-auditor knew that
the company intended to circulate the certified balance sheet to various
unidentified lenders as part of the company's loan application process.'
The plaintiff, a bank, approved a loan for the company relying on the
balance sheet, and subsequently lost the entire amount of the loan when
the company filed for bankruptcy.61 Plaintiff then filed a negligent mis-
representation action against the auditor.62 The court, in refusing to
hold the auditor liable for negligent misrepresentation to the party
outside the contract, based its decision on a concern as to where liability
to third parties should end.63 The court determined that liability could
extend only to third parties who were actually known and identified ben-
eficiaries of the auditf" The court feared that to hold otherwise could
"expose accountants to liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class." 65
Criticism of Ultramares began immediately.66 Nevertheless, the
57. Id.
58. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Professors Prosser and Keeton describe Ul-
tramares as "It]he leading case on this entire subject... ." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 39, at 747.
59. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 174-75, 174 N.E. at 442.
60. Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
61. Id. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 443.
62. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
63. Id. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
66. See, eg., Note, supra note 52, where the author argued:
The fact that the majority of businessmen place considerable reliance upon the certi-
fied public accountants certificate leads one to question the soundness of the decision
rendered in [Ultramares]. Essentially the problem is one affecting mercantile custom
and practice, and it is submitted that its treatment by the courts should be condi-
tioned by such considerations. The refusal to extend protection to purely economic
interests would appear to have been outmoded by the present day tendency toward
establishing those interests on a par with those of bodily integrity.
Id. at 865; see also Note, The Accountant's Liabilit--For What and To Whom, 36 IowA L.
REv. 319 (1951), which stated:
It would seem to be grossly unjust, even ridiculous, to exonerate a firm whose sole
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Ultramares rule dominated the law concerning third parties and negli-
gent misrepresentation, regardless of the profession involved, until the
1960s.
6 7
B. Modern Developments
It was in the 1960s that English courts finally rejected the long-
standing interpretation of Derry which denied any remedy for negligent
misrepresentation resulting solely in pecuniary losses. In Hedley Byrne
& Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,6 a the House of Lords held that
recovery could be had for negligent misrepresentation where the only
loss was pecuniary if a "special relationship" existed.69 The House of
Lords defined that special relationship as one
where it is plain that the party seeking information or advice
was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care as the
circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do
that, and where the other gave the information or advice when
he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was relying
on him.70
American courts have used much the same approach in whittling
away at Ultramares, thus expanding the scope of liability for negligent
misrepresentation.71 In recent years members of the following profes-
sions have been held liable for negligent misrepresentation for mere pecu-
niary loss, even in the absence of privity: title abstract preparers; 72
purpose in preparing a balance sheet was to provide prospective investors with infor-
mation which would be needed in order to render a considered judgement [sic] be-
cause too many people placed too much trust and confidence in the quality of their
servie.... A profession should not be permitted to reap the benefits of a position of
trust and confidence without assuming the responsibilites which should rightfully
accompany it.
Id. at 326-27.
Other commentators, however, approved of the Ultramares holding. See Keeton, The
Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1938). Keeton noted
that the courts limit liability, not necessarily because it is the fairest thing to the individuals
concerned, but because limiting liability is most conducive to the overall "social advantage"
and promotes "general economic progress." Id. at 2-3.
67. See Gossman, supra note 52, at 103.
68. 1964 App. Cas. 465 (1963).
69. Id. at 474, 486.
70. Id. For further discussion of the case, see Berus, supra note 7, at 127-28; Smillie, supra
note 7, at 232. Professor Smilie argued that the extension of liability in the Hedley Byrne
ruling should not be limited to negligent misrepresentation; instead, that case stands for the
broader proposition that one who negligently performs a service resulting in an economic loss
to a third party is liable where the "special relationship" of Hedley Byrne exists. Id. at 233.
71. See cases cited supra note 16.
72. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Annotation, Negligence in Preparing
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surveyors; 73 soil engineeers;74 architects;75 and attorneys.76
However, the scope of accountants' liability has been expanded the
most dramatically. A number of courts have expanded the scope of ac-
countants' liability for negligent misrepresentation to allow recovery by
classes of persons that are actually known to be foreseeable users of the
information.77  The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this ap-
proach in section 552.78
The Restatement approach was first applied to accountants in a
1968 case, Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin. 79 In Rusch, a Rhode Island cor-
poration sought financing from the plaintiff. Before the plaintiff would
grant the financing, it requested a review of the corporation's certified
financial statements.80 The defendant, Levin, was the accountant who
prepared the financial statements certifying that the corporation was sol-
vent, when, in fact, it was insolvent.8 The plaintiff relied on the certified
financial statements in granting a $337,000 loan. Soon after, the corpora-
Abstract of Title as Ground of Liability to One Other Than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 A.L.R.
4TH 314 (1986).
73. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Annotation, Surveyor's Liability For
Mistake In, Or Misrepresentation As To Accuracy Of Survey Of Real Property, 35 A.L.R. 3D
504 (1971).
74. See supra text accompanying note 16.
75. See supra text accompanying note 16.
76. See supra text accompanying note 16.
77. An actually known forseeable user is distinguishable from a merely forseeable user.
One actually knows a foreseeable user where one does not know the specific identity of the
third party, but does actually know that a limited group might be relying on the report. For
example, the auditor does not know which specific bank will be relying on an audited state-
ment, but he does know that some bank will be relying on it. A foreseeable user, however,
could be any third party that the auditor, if he thought about it, might reasonably foresee as
relying on the report. Obviously, the latter is a much broader category.
78. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 552 (1977). This section provides that:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a
transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient
so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in
any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Id.
79. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying Rhode Island law).
80. Id. at 86.
81. Id.
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tion went into receivership, leaving the loan unpaid. 2 In its decision, the
court distinguished the Rusch case from Ultramares. The court noted
that the plaintiff in Ultramares was a member of "an undefined, unlim-
ited class of remote lenders and potential equity holders, not actually
foreseen, but only foreseeable."83 In contrast, the plaintiff in Rusch was
"a single party whose reliance was actually foreseen by the defendant."84
Although the holding suggested that, if faced with a situation similar to
that in Ultramares, the court may have arrived at a decision in line with
Ultramares, the Rusch case was interpreted as greatly expanding ac-
countants' liability. Rusch thus spawned a whole series of cases that
have effectuated such an expansion in a number of other jurisdictions."
Today, most American jurisdictions follow either the Ultramares
approach 6 or the Restatement approach regarding accountants' liabil-
ity.8 7 A few jurisdictions, however, have adopted a third approach: Neg-
ligent misrepresenters can be liable to any party who might reasonably be
a foreseeable user of the information, so long as the user received the
statements from the defendant for business purposes.88 Under this third
approach, potential liability for negligent misrepresentation is greatly ex-
panded, almost to the point of being unlimited.89 Whether publishers
eventually will be included within the expanding scope of liability for
negligent misrepresentation is an issue still to be resolved. A comparison
of the development of this tort as it has been applied to public account-
ants with how it might be applied to the publishing business portends
application of liability to publishers.
82. Id. at 86-87.
83. Id. at 91 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)).
84. Id.
85. See, ag., Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Aluma Kraft Mfg. v. Fox &
Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1973); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d
154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971).
86. New York courts have continued to follow Ultramares. See, e.g., Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
For other jurisdictions that still follow Ultramares, see Toro Co. v. Krouse Kern & Co., 827
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987); Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971);
Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
87. See Gossman, supra note 52, at 103.
88. New Jersey was the first jurisdiction to adopt this standard. See Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). Wisconsin quickly followed Rosenblum in Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983). Since then, a
California appellate court adopted this approach in International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986), as did Mississippi
in Touche Ross v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
89. For a discussion of the expanding scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation, see
Comment, supra note 7; Note, supra note 7.
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III. A COMPARISON: POLICY ARGUMENTS REGARDING
AccouNTANTs AND NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The basic policy of where to draw the line for accountants' liability
for economic loss arising from negligent misrepresentation has revolved
around how far to extend the scope of financial liability, in terms of num-
bers of plaintiffs. Should it be extended to just an immediate, known
party or to any reasonably foreseeable user of the information? The pol-
icy concern with respect to publisher liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation, setting aside first amendment considerations for the moment, is
similar: How far should the scope of financial liability extend? In at-
tempting to predict how courts will treat the publisher liability issue it is
useful to examine the three approaches that are currently followed in
American jurisdictions regarding accountants' liability,90 then compar-
ing how the policy concerns of each approach would apply to publisher
liability.
A. Ultramares: The Traditional Approach
For three decades, the Ultramares Corp. v. Touche9 approach dom-
inated the scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation in this coun-
try.92 Judge Cardozo's policy concern in adopting the Ultramares
holding-that one is liable for negligent misrepresentation only to those
with whom one is in privity or to third parties actually known to be the
beneficiary of the representations-was to protect professionals from fi-
nancial ruin due to indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class, as
such liability would impede the free flow of commerce. 93 More recently,
a New York court, in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,9
reaffirmed its commitment to the Ultramares approach, citing the same
90. See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
91. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
92. See Gossman, supra note 52, at 102-03.
93. Judge Cardozo expressed this concern as follows:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other
than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal
or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of
the public, will become liable to the investors .... Title companies insuring titles to
a tract of land,... will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a
policy without payment of a premium.
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
94. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). The New York court spe-
cifically noted that its holding was "intended to preserve the wisdom and policy set forth" in
the Ultramares decision. Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (citing U1-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)); see also New Castle Siding Co.
v. Wolfson, 63 N.Y.2d 782, 470 N.E.2d 868, 481 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1984); White v. Guarente, 43
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policy concern-unlimited liability to an unlimited number of parties-
as cited by Judge Cardozo fifty-four years earlier.95
Jurisdictions following the Ultramares approach obviously will not
extend the scope of negligent misrepresentation to hold publishers liable
to their readers for printing errors.96 In fact, in several recent decisions
concerning the issue of publisher liability for negligence, courts have re-
fused to hold publishers liable based on the same policy argument used in
Ultramares-indeterminate liability to an indeterminate number of peo-
ple would financially destroy publishers." For example, in First Equity
Corp. of Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp.,98 a New York federal district
court, refused to impose liability on Standard & Poor's for a negligent
factual misstatement in its publication Corporation Records.99 Corpora-
tion Records, a service published semimonthly by Standard & Poor's and
provided primarily to specific subscribers, contains bond-rating defini-
tions, stock offerings, bond offerings, and other information about lead-
ing corporations."° One of the subscribers, First Equity, an investment
banking firm, relied on erroneous information contained in Corporation
Records in making an investment decision.101 Subsequently, First Equity
suffered a financial loss due to this reliance."°2 The court refused to im-
pose liability, primarily because "the potential number of persons to
whom a publication might become available is without limit."'1 3
In 1985, an Illinois court took a similar position in Alm v. Van Nos-
trand Reinhold Co.1 o In Alm, the plaintiff purchased a "How To" book
on the making of tools, published by the defendant.' Although the
plaintiff followed the instructions in the book, he was injured when a tool
made according to the book's instructions shattered.'0 6 The court re-
fused to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation primarily be-
N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977); Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 441
N.Y.S.2d 90, aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
95. See supra notes 83, 93 and accompanying text.
96. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 446-47. Indeed, in the Ultramares decision,
in an effort to illustrate the absurdity of making accountants liable to third parties for negligent
misrepresentation, Judge Cardozo stated that if such liability were found it would be only a
short step "to the declaration of a like liability on the part of proprietors of newspapers." Id.
97. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
98. 670 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
99. Id. at 118.
100. Id. at 116.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 117.
104. 134 Ill. App. 3d 716, 480 N.E.2d 1263 (1985).
105. Id. at 717, 480 N.E.2d at 1264.
106. Id.
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cause of the "undeterminable number of potential readers" to whom the
liability would extend.107
Thus, jurisdictions following Ultramares have not and likely will
not, extend liability for negligent misrepresentation to publishers. 10 8
However, for those jurisdictions following the Restatement approach and
the foreseeable user approach, the step could indeed be a short one, easily
taken.
B. Restatement Approach
The Restatement approach 0 9 to holding accountants liable for neg-
ligent misrepresentation to third parties was first adopted judicially in an
Iowa Supreme Court case, Ryan v. Kanne.110 In Ryan, the accountants
knew they had been employed to prepare a balance sheet for a company
for use by potential but not specifically identified lenders.' Due to the
accountants' negligence, the balance sheet showed the company to be
solvent, when actually it was not. 2 The court, in rejecting the UI-
tramares approach and its "social utility rationale," reiterated the long-
standing principle of tort law "that the risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."' 1 3 The court then embraced the Restate-
ment approach in holding that accountants would be liable to third par-
ties, whether or not specifically identified, whom the accountants knew
would be relying on financial statements prepared by them. 4
Other jurisdictions have followed Iowa in adopting the Restatement
107. Id. at 721, 480 N.E.2d at 1267; see also Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322
A.2d 824 (1974).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
109. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
110. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). A year earlier, a Rhode Island district court, in a diver-
sity case in which it applied Rhode Island law, held that Ultramares would not preclude the
court from imposing liability on an accountant to a single third party "whose reliance was
actually foreseen by the defendant." Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91-93
(D.R.I. 1968). The court in Rusch questioned the wisdom of the Ultramares decision:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an
accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed
and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the
cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost
onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate
the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?
Id. at 91 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)).
111. Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 399.
112. The balance sheet showed the company's net worth to be $44,424.82, when in fact the
company was insolvent and had a deficit of $5,443.34. Id. at 401.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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approach.11 Ohio adopted this approach in Haddon View Investment
Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand.1 6 The Ohio court rejected the Ultramares
approach as no longer being consistent with modem business realities.
The court reasoned that, in today's business world, accountants expect
that their reports routinely will be relied upon by third parties.' 17 Thus,
their duty should extend "to any third person to whom they understand
the reports will be shown for business purposes." 1 8
Moreover, Haddon View Investment Co. is significant because it
formed the basis for Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.," 9 a decision issued by the
Ohio Court of Appeals holding that a publisher of a general circulation
newspaper could be held liable for pecuniary loss resulting from negli-
gent misrepresentations in its financial pages.1 20 Although later over-
ruled on this point by the Ohio Supreme Court,121 Gutter is an example
of how Restatement section 552 can be applied to publishers.
In Gutter, the court explained how Dow Jones, publisher of the
Wall Street Journal, could be held liable under Restatement section 552
to a subscriber of the Journal for incorrectly reporting the trading status
of a stock. 122 In reliance on the incorrect report, the subscriber had suf-
fered a financial loss.1 23 The court reasoned that if certain circumstances
were present, section 552 would be as applicable to newspapers as it was
to accountants. First, the plaintiff must prove negligence by the newspa-
per. 124 Second, the plaintiff must show that the erroneous information
"was published for the specific benefit and guidance of a limited group of
subscribers with the knowledge or intention that it could influence and be
relied upon by that limited class in making investments."' 12 Third, a
plaintiff would have to prove that he was a member of that limited group
of subscribers who reasonably relied on the information. 26 Finally, the
plaintiff must show economic loss as a result of the reliance. 127
The first requirement, proving negligence, and the fourth require-
115. See cases cited supra note 85.
116. 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).
117. Id. at 157, 436 N.E.2d at 215.
118. Id.
119. No. 84AP-1029 slip op. (Ohio 10th App. Dist. May 16, 1985) (WESTLAW, Ohio li-
brary, Cases file), rev'd, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986).
120. Id. at 4 (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 4-5).
121. 22 Ohio St. 3d at 291, 490 N.E. at 902.
122. Gutter, No. 84AP-1029, slip op. at 4 (WESTLAW Ohio library, Cases file at 4-5).
123. Id. at 2 (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 2).
124. Id. at 4 (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 4).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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ment, proving economic loss, are relatively straightforward.1 28 The sec-
ond and third requirements are most likely to evoke controversy in the
case of publisher liability. With respect to the second requirement-that
the erroneous information was published for a specific group with the
intent or knowledge it will influence decisions129-- courts have generally
viewed dissemination of facts in newspapers as being for informational
purposes only, and not for purposes of guiding a specific group of sub-
scribers in making economic decisions.11° Regarding the third require-
ment-that the plaintiff was a member of a limited group of subscribers
who reasonably relied on the information 3 1-courts have generally
taken the position that people have not acted reasonably if they relied
exclusively on newspaper reports in making economic decisions.
1 32
Thus, it appears that it would indeed be difficult for a plaintiff to
prove the second and third requirements set forth for publisher liability
by the Ohio appellate court in Gutter.1 33 The difficulty of proving the
second and third elements in itself is a limiting factor likely to preclude
publishers from potential liability to the entire universe of its readers.
128. See supra notes 124 and 127 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. See, ag., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La.) (newspaper
publisher unaware of false information in advertisements not liable for their falsity), aff'd, 834
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (encyclopedia publisher not liable for misstating toxicity of a drug); Yuhas v. Mudge,
129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (1974) (newspaper not liable for advertisement of a defec-
tive product); Rubinstein v. New York Post Corp., 128 Misc. 2d 1, 488 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1985)
(newspaper not liable for publication of obituary for person not deceased).
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. See, eg., Samuel Sheitelman, Inc. v. Hoffman, 106 N.J. Super. 353, 255 A.2d 807
(1969). The court there stated, "Generally, there is no legal obligation on a newspaper re-
porter to give such an accurate account of the subject upon which he reports as would vouch
for its truthfulness." Id. at 355, 225 A.2d at 809; see also Carpenter, supra note 44, who fore-
saw this issue decades ago:
How far shall we go in imposing liability? Suppose a newspaper publishes an inaccu-
rate statement carelessly in its news columns. Should the paper be liable to one who
was misled into action by relying upon such statement to his damage? These state-
ments it is well known are not made to induce action, but merely as news hastily
gathered and under circumstances where it would be impossible in most instances to
verify their truth. Reliance upon such a statement would ordinarily constitute con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Id. at 758.
However, Carpenter did argue that a better case for plaintiffs would be one where an
inaccurate advertisement was carelessly published:
It would seem that there is a better basis for liability in the advertising case. The
advertisement is put out as a part of the paper's business to induce reliance on the
part of readers, and the readers should not be considered guilty of contributory negli-
gence for relying upon the statement.
Id.
133. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
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However, if a plaintiff can prove the second and third elements, why
should a publisher (first amendment considerations aside) be held to a
different standard than an accountant or any other professional?
In First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp.,134 the
issue was whether the publisher should be held liable for a negligently
published error in Corporation Records.13' The annual subscription rate
for Corporation Records in April 1988 exceeded $1,340.136 Such a rate
indicates that Corporation Records is a markedly different type of publi-
cation than the corner newspaper, which is produced every twenty-four
hours under heavy deadline pressure, and is purchased by the ordinary
individual for a nominal amount at the local newspaper stand. Corpora-
tion Records is a publication purchased principally by a specific and
known group of users, such as the investment banking firm-plaintiff in
First Equity, in the regular course of their business to make investment
decisions and advise clients. Moreover, Standard & Poor's, the publisher
of Corporation Records, certainly foresees reliance by its subscribers in
making such decisions and giving such advice. If accountants are to be
held liable to a class of known users for the information contained in
their reports that they should reasonably expect will be relied on by some
third parties, why should not a publisher, like Standard & Poor's, be held
liable if similar circumstances prevail?
Jurisdictions that follow the Restatement approach for accountants'
liability 137 could very well begin applying the same approach to publish-
ers' liability. The policy reason behind adopting the Restatement ap-
proach has been the classic tort principle, "[tihe risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." 138 This same principle applies
to publications like Corporation Records. Standard & Poor's reasonably
should perceive that its subscribers will rely on and be influenced by the
financial information contained in Corporation Records, and that if that
information is in error, a financial loss could be suffered.
In addition, parties such as the plaintiff in First Equity are likely to
prevail on the issue of whether they are a limited group of subscribers
whose reliance was reasonable. Subscribers to publications like Corpora-
tion Records, which are targeted toward a specific and limited readership
to be used for a specific purpose and are prepared by an agency that
134. 670 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the case.
135. First Equity, 670 F. Supp. at 116.
136. The actual subscription rate was $1341. Id. n.1.
137. See supra note 85.
138. Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 401 (citing Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(1968)).
[Vol. 22:761
EXPANDING PUBLISHER LIABILITY
reputedly has expertise in the market of financial information, should be
able to rely on the accuracy of the publications' contents.
Arguments for reliance on newspapers, however, are less compel-
ling. Publications such as Corporation Records are, for the most part,
read only by a very specific group. In contrast, the Wall Street Journal,
the publication at issue in Gutter, while probably not read by the average
person on the street, is read by a much larger and more diverse group of
people. Thus, most courts following the Restatement approach may be
reluctant to find the second Gutter requirement-that the plaintiff was a
member of a limited group of subscribers for whose specific benefit and
guidance the information was published 139-met in cases involving news-
papers of general circulation.
In addition, the reasonableness of relying on a stock quotation
printed in a newspaper of general circulation is certainly more question-
able than is the reasonableness of relying on a service such as Corporation
Records. Even the appellate court in Gutter indicated that if Dow Jones,
the publisher of the Wall Street Journal, could prove that it "merely pub-
lished a newspaper which reported financial news for informational pur-
poses" then there would be no liability. The court noted that "a
newspaper is not liable to either subscribers or the general public for pub-
lishing incorrect information." 1" The Gutter court merely held that a
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to prove that the conditions set
forth in Restatement section 552 exist. 4 The court offered no opinion
as to whether the plaintiff would prevail if the case were presented to the
trier of fact.
Due to the difficulty of proving reasonable reliance, it is unlikely
that the average newspaper could be held liable for negligent misrepre-
sentation for printing erroneous facts under the Restatement standard.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court, in overruling the appellate court in
Gutter, determined that a plaintiff should not be given the opportunity to
prove the existence of the section 552 criteria because newspapers could
not be held liable for mere negligence, regardless of the circumstances. 42
The court offered two reasons for its ruling. First, under the circum-
stances of the case, the section 552 criteria could never be established
since a typical newspaper reader "does not fall within a special limited
class (or group) of foreseeable persons" required by the Restatement, and
139. Gutter, 84AP-1029, slip op. at 4 (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 4). See supra
note 125 and accompanying text.
140. Id. (WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 5).
141. Id. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
142. Gutter, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 289, 490 N.E.2d at 900-01.
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a newspaper reader's reliance on a newspaper, without additional verifi-
cation, could not be justifiable as a matter of law. 143 Second, first amend-
ment concerns demanded that the court refuse to apply the tort of
negligent misrepresentation to newspapers. The court feared that apply-
ing the tort to newspapers would have a chilling effect on expression that
would be constitutionally unacceptable. 144
Setting aside first amendment concerns, the Ohio Supreme Court's
reasoning with respect to section 552 does not preclude applying negli-
gent misrepresentation to publications like Corporation Records. As dis-
cussed previously, subscribers to such a publication are a special, limited
class of foreseeable persons who may reasonably rely on the accuracy of
the information contained in that publication.1 45 Thus, even under the
Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning, section 552 does apply to specialized
publications like Corporation Records.
4 6
As the above discussion illustrates, courts following the Restatement
approach to accountants' liability could easily apply the same approach
to a limited group of publications that cater to a specific readership,
while not going to the extreme of applying liability to general publica-
tions. Those jurisdictions that follow the foreseeable user approach,
however, might just take both of these steps.
C. Foreseeable User Approach
The foreseeable user standard holds accountants liable to any rea-
sonably foreseeable user of the information who received it for a proper
business purpose. The standard was first adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.147 Just three weeks later
the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a similar rule in Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co. '" Later, the Mississippi Supreme Court,
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,149 and a Cali-
fornia appellate court, in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corp., 5° adopted the same rule. These courts acknowledge
that adopting the foreseeable user rule does, indeed, open up the possibil-
143. Id. at 289, 490 N.E.2d at 900.
144. Id., 490 N.E.2d at 901.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
146. See infra notes 172-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of first amendment
concerns regarding publisher liability for negligent misrepresentation.
147. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
148. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
149. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
150. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see
Gossman, supra note 52, at 99-100, 112-22.
[Vol. 22:761
EXPANDING PUBLISHER LIABILITY
ity of liability to the entire world."'1 Nevertheless, they have justified
their approach with public policy arguments.15 2 An analysis of these rea-
sons indicates that these courts could handily apply the same rationale to
publisher liability.
First, the foreseeable user approach was adopted out of considera-
tions of basic fairness. The courts adopting this approach reasoned that
imposing duties of reasonable care creates liability for all foreseeable con-
sequences, and that this liability should be applied uniformly, with an
exception only when a strong public policy reason dictates otherwise. 53
Moreover, fairness dictates that because other professionals are now held
liable to foreseeable third parties, accountants should be held to the same
standard. 5 Public policy demands that innocent parties who were fore-
seeable users of information should be compensated for losses suffered
due to their reasonable reliance on negligently prepared information.
1 55
Courts adopting the foreseeable user approach also have taken the
position that there is no logical reason to distinguish between a foreseen
user (the Restatement approach) and a foreseeable user. 156 The foreseen
user does not pay for the audit report any more than the foreseeable user
does, so why should the foreseen user be protected by a greater duty on
the part of the auditor?
15 7
Moreover, courts adopting this approach assert that imposing a
duty to all foreseeable users would encourage greater care.1 58 Further,
the financial impact of this expanded duty of care would be spread to all
151. See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
153. See International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227 ("An
innocent plaintiff who forseeably relies on an independent auditor's unqualified financial state-
ment should not be made to bear the burden of the professional's malpractice."); Rosenblum,
93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147 (" 'Whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness.'"
(emphasis original) (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186
A.2d 291, 293 (1962)); Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366 ("The
fundamental principle of Wisconsin negligence law is that a tortfeasor is fully liable for all
foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences are limited by policy factors
... [thus] accountants' liability to third parties should be determined under the accepted prin-
ciples of Wisconsin negligence law. According to these principles, a finding of non-liability
will be made only if there is a strong public policy requiring such a finding.").
154. International Mortgage Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221,
226.
155. Id. at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
156. See, eg., Touche Ross, 514 So. 2d at 321 (citing Comment, The Enlarging Scope of
Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 281, 287 (1983)).
157. Id.
158. See International Mortgage Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227;
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335
N.W.2d at 365.
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customers of the auditor through increased charges for services to cover
the cost of malpractice insurance premiums.
15 9
Finally, these courts have analogized an accountant's duties to fore-
seeable users with those duties of a product manufacturer.160 In response
to the argument that adopting the foreseeable user standard will expose
accountants to potentially unlimited financial liability, the courts adopt-
ing the foreseeable user approach have noted that such protectionist con-
cerns were given up long ago with respect to product manufacturers.
61
Further, the reason strict liability has been imposed on manufacturers of
products applies with equal force to accountants.1 62 When manufactur-
ers send their goods into the stream of commerce in a quest for profit,
they assume a responsibilty to the public.163 Public policy demands that
when products cause injuries, even if no negligence occurred, the inno-
cent victim is entitled to compensation for those injuries.'" The proper
parties to provide that compensation are the manufacturers and market-
ers of the product. The cost of the liability insurance to cover injuries
can be treated as a cost of production, ultimately paid for by all consum-
ers of the product.1 61 Similarly, when accountants, in their quest for
profit, send information into the marketplace, they assume a responsibil-
ity to foreseeable users.
This "foreseeable user" approach to accountants' liability could eas-
ily be extended to publishers' liability. Other than first amendment con-
159. International Mortgage Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227; Rosen-
blum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 151; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at
365.
160. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147, where the court stated:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the absence of privity
when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's claim also sounds in tort, but is
based on liability for defects in products arising out of a negligent misrepresentation?
If recovery for defective products may include economic loss, why should such loss
not be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of the
product and the person making a written representation with intent that it be relied
upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the product is reasonably fit, suita-
ble and safe and that the representation is reasonably sufficient, suitable and accurate.
Id.; see also International Mortgage Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
161. See, e.g., International Mortgage Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221
(citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)), where the court
noted: "Interestingly, Justice Cardozo had no... protectionist concerns for manufacturers,"
162. The strict liability standard for manufacturers is reflected in RESTATEMENT, supra
note 78, § 402A.
163. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
164. Id.
165. RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, at comment c. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d. 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, where strict liability for defective products was initially adopted as an
independent tort.
[Vol. 22:761
EXPANDING PUBLISHER LIABILITY
cerns, the major justification asserted by the courts for refusing to hold
publishers liable for negligent misrepresentation has been the draconian
financial ramifications of such liability.166 However, publishers, just as
do manufacturers of products, can obtain liability insurance.' 67 The cost
of such insurance can be included in production costs and built into the
price of the publication, thus spreading the cost to all consumers.
Furthermore, the fairness arguments are just as compelling for read-
ers of publications as for users of products. As between the innocent
reader of a publication who relies on erroneous information, thereby suf-
fering a financial loss, and the negligent publisher of the information, the
negligent party should be held liable. This argument is particularly ap-
pealing when considering the facts in Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc. 6 The
Wall Street Journal negligently printed an erroneous stock quotation.
Relying on the erroneous information, Gutter made an investment deci-
sion and suffered an economic loss as a result.' 69 The Wall Street Jour-
nal bills itself as the journal to read to keep informed of all important
business news.' 70 Every issue contains extensive stock market quota-
tions. Presumably, the publisher, Dow Jones, prints the Journal because
it makes a profit from doing so. The producer of a product which is a
source of financial news should not receive any greater protection from
its negligence than the producer of any other product.
Continuing the analogy between product liability and publisher lia-
bility for negligent misrepresentation, contributory negligence is not a
defense to a product liability action. 171 Similarly, the reader of erroneous
information should be able to rely on that information without proving
that he was reasonable in doing so, so long as he had no reason to suspect
its lack of accuracy. If one overcomes the reliance issue, then even daily
publications like the Wall Street Journal could be made liable for negli-
gent misrepresentation. Extending liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion to publishers would be a small step indeed for those courts that have
adopted the foreseeable user standard for accountants.
166. See, eg., Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
167. See Spellman, Avoiding the Chilling Effect: News Media Tort and First Amendment
Insurance, 7 COMM. & LAW 13 (1985), for a discussion of recent developments in liability
insurance for publishers.
168. 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986). See supra notes 119-144 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Gutter.
169. Gutter, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 286-87, 490 N.E.2d at 899.
170. The Educational Edition of the Wall Street Journal bills itself as a "concise digest of
the most important business news of the day. Everyday. It has to be. More than four million
readers count on the Journal to keep them informed." Educational Edition of the Wall Street
Journal, 1987-88, at 2, col. 1.
171. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 711-12.
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The judicial decisions protecting publishers from the tort of negli-
gent misrepresentation have relied heavily on the proposition that the
first amendment protects publishers from the scope of the tort. 7 2 An
analysis of recent first amendment cases, however, illustrates that in
some instances such reliance may be misplaced, and that the trend may
be moving toward reducing the degree of first amendment protection for
publisher liability for negligence in the reporting of mere factual
information. 1
73
The question that must be dealt with on the issue of publisher liabil-
ity for negligent misrepresentation is: What precisely does the first
amendment protect? The Supreme Court's first amendment cases speak
of protection for "free political discussion,"174 the "unfettered in-
terchange of ideas," 175 and an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas.' 76
The free flow of ideas and thoughts, then, is what is protected. 77 As the
United States Supreme Court stated in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 178 the United States has "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... ,179
Through the years, the Supreme Court has approved certain restric-
172. See, eg., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp 921, 923 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 834
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The First Amendment strongly counsels against adoption of a rule
establishing the kind of liability plaintiffs seek."); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F.
Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is guaran-
teed by the First Amendment... and the overriding societal interest in the untrammeled
dissemination of knowledge."); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 290, 490 N.E.2d
898, 902 (1986) ("the competing public policy and constitutional concerns tilt decidedly in
favor of the press when mere negligence is alleged.").
173. See infra notes 185-213.
174. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The Court stated: "The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional sys-
tem." Id. at 369.
175. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court stated that "[freedom of the
press protects the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people." Id. at 484.
176. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court stated: "It is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail ...." Id. at 390.
177. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944). The Court stated: "[The first
amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, and that a free
press is a condition of a free society." Id. at 20.
178. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
179. Id. at 270.
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tions that do interfere with the right to free speech. Libelous speech is
not protected by the first amendment."1 0 Nor does the first amendment
shield publishers from the applicability of laws, such as antitrust laws
and antidiscrimination laws, that allow the government to regulate some
aspects of the publisher's business."8 Commercial speech-speech ex-
pressing neither political nor social views, nor criticisms, nor any kind of
ideas 182 -while encompassed within the protections of the first amend-
ment, 1 83 can be restricted in certain ways not applicable to non-commer-
cial speech. For example, government may regulate advertising to
protect consumers from misleading claims. 8 The reporting of stock
market quotations, which express no political or social views, nor ideas
or criticisms of any kind, but merely facilitate the smooth operation of a
commercial marketplace, should fall into this less protected category of
commercial speech.
Furthermore, that free speech is protected does not mean speakers
are shielded by the first amendment from all responsibility for injuries
resulting from such speech. For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 85 the Supreme Court of the United States held a tele-
vision station liable for the tort of unlawful appropriation.186 After the
station televised the entire fifteen seconds of Zacchini's human can-
nonball act, which was appearing at a local fair, on its nightly news, the
owner of the act demanded payment from the station for unlawful appro-
180. See Roth, 354 U.S. 476; Beauharnois v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
181. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 391 (1973) (Pittsburgh city ordinance prohibiting help-wanted advertisements by sex does
not violate freedom of speech or press); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178,
184 (1946) (application of Fair Labor Standards Act to newspapers does not abridge freedom
of press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (application of Sherman
Antitrust Act to newspapers does not violate first amendment); Associated Press v. N.L.R.B,
301 U.S. 103, 130 (1937) (application of National Labor Relations Act to newspapers does not
violate first amendment).
182. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 384-85, for a discussion of what constitutes commer-
cial speech.
183. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(state law banning advertising by electric utility companies invalid); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state statute prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising about drugs invalid).
184. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (first amendment does not preclude
states from entirely prohibiting misleading advertising); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 772 (although states may not entirely prohibit advertising of drug prices by pharma-
cists, states may regulate commercial speech to insure "that the stream of commercial informa-
tion flows cleanly as well as freely.").
185. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
186. Id. at 574-75.
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priation.117 The station argued that the act was news and that it was
protected from liability by the first amendment.18 8 In rejecting the sta-
tion's argument, he Court noted that the-first amendment does not pro-
tect the news media from the tort of unlawful appropriation. 9 To hold
otherwise would permit the first amendment to be used as a shield
against copyright infringement actions. 9 In addition, the Court noted
that the owner of the act was not attempting to prevent the broadcast of
the performance; "he simply want[ed] to be paid for it."' 9
Lower courts have taken similar positions with respect to whether
the first amendment protects the media from certain types of tort liabil-
ity. In Weirum v. R.K.O. General, Inc.,192 a radio station was held liable
for the tort of negligence after one of its listeners, engaged in a station-
sponsored contest requiring him to race his car from location to location,
forced a car off the highway, killing its occupant.1 93 The court refused to
shield the station from liability under the first amendment for two rea-
sons. First, this was not the type of commercial activity that needed pro-
tection under the first amendment because of a possible chilling effect on
future speech.1 94 Second, the issue was not a free-speech issue, but one of
accountability for foreseeable results of an action that created an undue
risk of harm to others; "[t]he first amendment does not sanction the in-
fliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than
act."
, 19 5
A Texas court, in Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,
196
also contended that the first amendment does not shield the speaker from
all tort liability. In Eimann, the tort was negligence resulting in a wrong-
ful death.' 9 7 In rejecting the magazine's argument that it was protected
by the first amendment, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not at-
tempting to regulate speech "but only to recover damages for negligent
publication."198 The court then balanced free-speech concerns with the
187. Id. at 563-64.
188. Id. at 565.
189. Id. at 574-75.
190. Id. at 576.
191. Id. at 578.
192. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 536 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
193. Id. at 469, 539 P.2d at 37-39.
194. Id. at 473, 539 P.2d at 40.
195. Id.
196. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988), op. withdrawn and substituted by, No. H-87-0030
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). For a discussion of the case see
supra notes 21-25.
197. Id. at 864.
198. Id. at 865.
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interests of the plaintiff in proceeding on a negligence theory, determin-
ing that the plaintiff's interest should prevail. 199 The court emphasized,
however, that its holding applied only to commercial speech that creates
a potential hazard, not to core speech. °°
South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
Inc.,201 is another recent district court decision'that lilits the scope of
first amendment protection trom tort liability for pure commercial
speech.2"2 In South Carolina State Ports Authority, a federal district
court held that the first amendment did not protect a defendant from a
suit for negligent preparation of a report that caused economic injury to
the plaintiff.203 In this case, the defendant was hired by a third party, the
Georgia Ports Authority, to prepare an analysis of the ports at Savannah,
Georgia, operated by the Georgia Ports Authority, and Charleston,
South Carolina, operated by the plaintiff, comparing their current poten-
tial.2°  The report was then distributed to existing and potential custom-
ers of both ports.205 Alleging that the report contained misleading and
false information about the Charleston port, the plaintiff filed an action
for negligence.20 6 In rejecting the defendant's first amendment argu-
ment, the court noted that "[t]he right to free speech is not absolute,"
and that the "narrow contours" of this case, where the speech is mere
"'objective factual data,'" significantly limit first amendment protec-
tion.207 At the heart of first amendment concerns, the court reasoned,
are matters of public policy.208 When the speech consists solely of objec-
tive, factual data, though, first amendment concerns are greatly dimin-
ished because "'the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial
speech makes it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear
199. Id. at 865-87.
200. Id. at 866. The court noted that core speech--speech which effectuates a public ex-
change of ideas-is afforded a greater degree of first amendment protection than commercial
speech, which is "related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and his audience ....
and does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 865 n. 1, 866. For an earlier
case involving Soldier of Fortune similar to Eimann, see Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Maga-
zine, 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
201. 676 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1987).
202. Id. at 351.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 346-47.
205. Id. at 347.
206. Id. The complaint also originally contained counts for libel and tortious interference
with a contract. However, these counts were later dropped. Id.
207. Id. at 348.
208. Id. at 349.
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of silencing the speaker.' "209 Thus, the court held the speaker could be
held liable for negligence21° for several reasons: (1) the speech was pure
objective data, not opinion or debate;211 (2) the speaker had an opportu-
nity to verify the accuracy of the factual representations;2 12 and, (3) the
report had a limited audience.213
The holdings in these cases expanding the scope of negligence liabil-
ity of publishers and the news media who engage in commercial speech
could readily be expanded to encompass the type of negligent misrepre-
sentation in Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.214 The inaccurate stock market
quotation in that case was pure objective factual data, containing nothing
involving political discussion, the interchange of ideas, or any other mat-
ter typically associated with core speech.215 Thus, the level of first
amendment protection accorded a stock market quotation should be
much lower than that accorded core speech. Moreover, the plaintiff in
Gutter made no attempt to inhibit future publications of stock market
quotations;21 6 like the human cannonball, he simply sought compensa-
tion for the damages he had suffered.217 The most significant way in
which the negligent stock market quotation in Gutter differs from cases
in which first amendment considerations were held inapplicable to
speech of a commercial nature2 8 is that the number of potential victims
of a stock market quotation is much larger than the victims in those
cases. Since the financial ramifications of such a large audience being
potential victims could lead to a chilling effect, courts may be reluctant
to impose such liability in these cases. Note, however, the potentially
unlimited class of victims has not stopped the courts from imposing
widespread liability on product manufacturers, 219 and in some jurisdic-
tions, on accountants.220 It is certainly possible, then, that for speech
that is purely objective data, courts may impose liability on publishers for
209. Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
210. Id. at 351.
211. Id. at 348.
212. Id. at 349.
213. Id. at 350 n.10.
214. 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986). For a discussion of Gutter see supra notes
116-133, and accompanying text.
215. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., No. 84AP-102 at 5 (Ohio 10th App. Dist. 1985)
(WESTLAW, Ohio library, Cases file at 6). See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
216. See discussion of Gutter, supra notes 119-127.
217. See discussion of Zacchini, supra notes 185-191.
218. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 78-89, 109-118, 147-165 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:761
EXPANDING PUBLISHER LIABILITY
negligent misrepresentation, regardless of the numbers of possible
victims.
V. CONCLUSION
Presumably, publishers have ways of verifying the accuracy of
purely objective data, like stock market quotations, and, one would hope,
ways of safeguarding against printer's errors. In addition, newspapers
like the Wall Street Journal carry stock market quotations as an induce-
ment for people to buy their papers. Logically, then, the publishers of
objective data should be held to the same standard of liability as account-
ants and manufacturers of products.
Certainly, it is always difficult to predict trends in the law. How-
ever, as Professor Weisiger argued over a half-century ago, with societal
and economic changes come changes in the limitations of liability for
negligent misrepresentation.22' Increasing numbers of cases like Gutter
v. Dow Jones, Inc. 222 and Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,223
witness the initial stages of what could be the next expansion of the tort
of negligent misrepresentation: liability for publishers and the news me-
dia. Before the erosion of Ultramares, accountants probably thought it
would never happen to them. While publishers may think they are safe,
cases like South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
Inc.,224 limiting first amendment protections for purely objective data,
indicate that it is only a matter of time before publishers may be held
liable to anyone who is injured in reliance on that data.
221. Weisiger, supra note 48, at 874; see also note 50 and accompanying text.
222. 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986).
223. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988), op. withdrawn and substituted by No. 1-87-0030
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
224. 676 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C 1987).
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